IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. SC10-356
CASE NO. SC10-356
DAVID EUGENE JOHNSTON,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
ON APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA
OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,
IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA
INITIAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT
D. Todd Doss
Florida Bar No. 0910384
725 Southeast Baya DriveSuite 102
Lake City, FL 32025
Florida Bar No. 0910384
725 Southeast Baya DriveSuite 102
Lake City, FL 32025
(386) 755-9119
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This proceeding involves the appeal of the circuit court’s
order summarily denying Mr. Johnston’s successive Rule 3.851
motion regarding newly discovered evidence of mental retardation.
The following symbols will be used to designate references to the
record in this appeal:
order summarily denying Mr. Johnston’s successive Rule 3.851
motion regarding newly discovered evidence of mental retardation.
The following symbols will be used to designate references to the
record in this appeal:
“R.” – record on direct appeal to this Court;
“PCR.” - record on appeal after original postconvictionmotion summary denial.
“PCR2.” - record on appeal after fourth and fifthpostconviction motion summary denial.
‘PCR3.” - record on appeal after sixth postconvictionmotion summary denial.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
“PCR.” - record on appeal after original postconvictionmotion summary denial.
“PCR2.” - record on appeal after fourth and fifthpostconviction motion summary denial.
‘PCR3.” - record on appeal after sixth postconvictionmotion summary denial.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Mr. Johnston is presently under a death warrant with an
execution scheduled for March 9, 2009 at 6:00 p.m. This Court
has not hesitated to allow oral argument in other warrant cases
in a similar procedural posture. A full opportunity to air the
issues through oral argument would be more than appropriate in
this case, given the seriousness of the claims involved, as well
as Mr. Johnston’s pending execution date. Mr. Johnston, through
counsel, urges that the Court permit oral argument.
execution scheduled for March 9, 2009 at 6:00 p.m. This Court
has not hesitated to allow oral argument in other warrant cases
in a similar procedural posture. A full opportunity to air the
issues through oral argument would be more than appropriate in
this case, given the seriousness of the claims involved, as well
as Mr. Johnston’s pending execution date. Mr. Johnston, through
counsel, urges that the Court permit oral argument.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preliminary Statement
........................................................... i
Request for Oral Argument
........................................................... i
Table of Contents
........................................................... ii
Table of Authorities
........................................................... iii
Statement of the Case and Facts
........................................................... 1
Summary of Argument
........................................................... 12
Standard of Review
........................................................... 12
Argument I
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION
DEMONSTRATES MR. JOHNSTON’S DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES
THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND FLORIDA’S CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
........................................................... 13
A. The Circuit Court Improperly ConductedIndependent Research in Denying Mr. Johnston’sSixth Successive Motion to Vacate.
........................................................... 14
B. Contrary to the Circuit Court’s Order Mr.
Johnston’s Successive Motion Is Not Untimely.
........................................................... 18
C. Contrary to the Circuit Court’s Order Mr.
Johnston’s Sixth Successive Motion Is Not
An Abusive Successive Motion.
........................................................... i
Request for Oral Argument
........................................................... i
Table of Contents
........................................................... ii
Table of Authorities
........................................................... iii
Statement of the Case and Facts
........................................................... 1
Summary of Argument
........................................................... 12
Standard of Review
........................................................... 12
Argument I
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION
DEMONSTRATES MR. JOHNSTON’S DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES
THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND FLORIDA’S CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
........................................................... 13
A. The Circuit Court Improperly ConductedIndependent Research in Denying Mr. Johnston’sSixth Successive Motion to Vacate.
........................................................... 14
B. Contrary to the Circuit Court’s Order Mr.
Johnston’s Successive Motion Is Not Untimely.
........................................................... 18
C. Contrary to the Circuit Court’s Order Mr.
Johnston’s Sixth Successive Motion Is Not
An Abusive Successive Motion.
........................................................... 20
D. Contrary to the Circuit Court’s Order Mr.
Johnston’s Successive Motion Is Based UponNewly Discovered Evidence.
........................................................... 23
CONCLUSION
........................................................... 25
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
........................................................... 25
CERTIFICATE OF FONT
........................................................... 26
CONCLUSION
........................................................... 25
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
........................................................... 25
CERTIFICATE OF FONT
........................................................... 26
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) .... 3-4,12-13, 19,24
Coleman v. State, FSC Case No. SC04-1520 ................. 19
Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1999) .............. 13
Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243 (Fla. 2001) ................ 23
Hallman v. State, 371 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1979) .............. 24
Johnston v. Dugger, 583 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1991) ........... 1,3
Johnston v. Moore, 789 So.2d 262 (Fla. 2001)............... 3
Johnston v. Singletary, 162 F.3d 630 (11th Cir. 1998) ...... 2
Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1986) ........... 1,9
Johnston v. State, 708 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1998)........... 2,16
Johnston v. State, 960 So.2d 757 (Fla. 2006) .............. 3
Coleman v. State, FSC Case No. SC04-1520 ................. 19
Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1999) .............. 13
Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243 (Fla. 2001) ................ 23
Hallman v. State, 371 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1979) .............. 24
Johnston v. Dugger, 583 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1991) ........... 1,3
Johnston v. Moore, 789 So.2d 262 (Fla. 2001)............... 3
Johnston v. Singletary, 162 F.3d 630 (11th Cir. 1998) ...... 2
Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1986) ........... 1,9
Johnston v. State, 708 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1998)........... 2,16
Johnston v. State, 960 So.2d 757 (Fla. 2006) .............. 3
Johnston v. State, No. SC09-839, Slip Op.
(Fla. January 21, 2010) ................................ 3,21
Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1991) ................ 24
Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 So.2d 1364 (Fla. 1989) ........ 25
Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1996).............. 19
Marek v. State, 14 So.3d 985 (Fla. 2009) ................. 24
Moreland v. State, 582 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1991) ............. 25
Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1999) ............ 12-13
Richardson v. State, 546 So.2d 1037 (Fla. 1989) .......... 25
Smith v. Dugger, 565 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 1990) .............. 25
State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2001) .......... 12
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 1999) ............12
PROCEDURAL RULES
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 ............... I, 14-15, 17-18, 24-25
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203 ........................... 6-8, 17-20
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.203 ........................... 6-8, 17-20
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Johnston was indicted on December 12, 1983 by an Orange
County grand jury for the first-degree murder of Mary Hammond.
Following a trial, Mr. Johnston was found guilty as charged by a
jury. A penalty phase was conducted on May 29, 1984, during
which the jury recommended a death sentence by an eight to four
vote. On June 1, 1984, the trial court imposed a death sentence,
finding three aggravating circumstances. Although the court
found mitigating factors,1 it found the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced
Mr. Johnston to death (R. 2412-2415). On direct appeal to the
Florida Supreme Court, Mr. Johnston’s conviction and sentence
were affirmed. Johnston v. State, 497 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1986).
On October 28, 1988, a death warrant was signed, the
execution of which was ultimately stayed subsequent to the filing
of Mr. Johnston’s first motion to vacate judgment and sentence in
state court. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court
denied all relief. The denial was appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court, which affirmed the circuit court’s decision.
Johnston v. Dugger, 583 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1991).
execution of which was ultimately stayed subsequent to the filing
of Mr. Johnston’s first motion to vacate judgment and sentence in
state court. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court
denied all relief. The denial was appealed to the Florida
Supreme Court, which affirmed the circuit court’s decision.
Johnston v. Dugger, 583 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1991).
1The trial court found Mr. Johnston was the product of abroken home; he was abused; he was neglected and rejected by hisnatural mother; he was physically abused by his father; he wasgreatly affected by his father’s death; he has a very low I.Q.
and did not do well in school; and he was mentally disturbed (R.
2412-2415).
and did not do well in school; and he was mentally disturbed (R.
2412-2415).
Mr. Johnston next filed a federal habeas petition and on
September 16, 1993 the federal district court granted
Mr. Johnston habeas corpus relief and ordered the State of
Florida to either (1) impose a life sentence; (2) conduct a new
penalty phase proceeding before a newly empaneled jury; or (3)
obtain an appellate re-weighing or harmless-error analysis. On
remand, this Court conducted a harmless-error analysis and
thereafter reimposed a death sentence. Johnston v. Singletary,
640 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1994).2 The federal habeas court
subsequently denied all relief.
In the interim, Mr. Johnston filed his first successive
motion to vacate judgment and sentence in the circuit court. The
circuit court denied relief, finding the claims time-barred and,
alternatively, an abuse of process. This Court thereafter
affirmed the circuit court and also denied Mr. Johnston’s state
habeas petition. Johnston v. State, 708 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1998).
motion to vacate judgment and sentence in the circuit court. The
circuit court denied relief, finding the claims time-barred and,
alternatively, an abuse of process. This Court thereafter
affirmed the circuit court and also denied Mr. Johnston’s state
habeas petition. Johnston v. State, 708 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1998).
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently ruled on
Mr. Johnston’s appeal from the denial of his habeas petition in
federal district court and denied all relief. Johnston v.
Singletary, 162 F.3d 630 (11th Cir. 1998).
Mr. Johnston’s appeal from the denial of his habeas petition in
federal district court and denied all relief. Johnston v.
Singletary, 162 F.3d 630 (11th Cir. 1998).
Mr. Johnston subsequently filed a successive state habeas
petition wherein he claimed that this Court applied an incorrect
petition wherein he claimed that this Court applied an incorrect
2A petition for writ of certiorari was filed in the UnitedStates Supreme Court, and it was denied on February 27, 1995.
standard of review in its 1991 opinion (Johnston v. Dugger, 583
So.2d 657 (Fla. 1991)). This Court denied relief. Johnston v.
Moore, 789 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 2001).
Thereafter, Mr. Johnston filed his third motion to vacate
judgment and sentence wherein he claimed the Florida capital
sentencing scheme was unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, and
that the State of Florida was barred from executing him under
Atkins v. Virginia due to his mental retardation. Following the
denial of relief by the circuit court, this Court affirmed.
Johnston v. State, 960 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2006).
judgment and sentence wherein he claimed the Florida capital
sentencing scheme was unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, and
that the State of Florida was barred from executing him under
Atkins v. Virginia due to his mental retardation. Following the
denial of relief by the circuit court, this Court affirmed.
Johnston v. State, 960 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2006).
On April 20, 2009, Florida Governor Crist signed a warrant
for Mr. Johnston and set his execution date for May 27, 2009.
Subsequently, Mr. Johnston filed his fourth successive motion to
vacate his judgment and sentence. While the motion was summarily
denied by the circuit court, on appeal this Court issued an order
relinquishing jurisdiction and remanding to the circuit court for
ninety days to conduct DNA testing.
for Mr. Johnston and set his execution date for May 27, 2009.
Subsequently, Mr. Johnston filed his fourth successive motion to
vacate his judgment and sentence. While the motion was summarily
denied by the circuit court, on appeal this Court issued an order
relinquishing jurisdiction and remanding to the circuit court for
ninety days to conduct DNA testing.
Subsequent to the DNA testing, Mr. Johnston filed his fifth
successive motion to vacate his judgment and sentence claiming
that newly discovered evidence that blood was not found on Mr.
Johnston’s clothes warranted a new trial. The circuit court
denied both the fourth and fifth successive motions to vacate the
judgment and sentence. On January 21, 2010, this Court affirmed
the denial of relief. Johnston v. State, No. SC09-839, Slip Op.
successive motion to vacate his judgment and sentence claiming
that newly discovered evidence that blood was not found on Mr.
Johnston’s clothes warranted a new trial. The circuit court
denied both the fourth and fifth successive motions to vacate the
judgment and sentence. On January 21, 2010, this Court affirmed
the denial of relief. Johnston v. State, No. SC09-839, Slip Op.
(Fla. January 21, 2010). On that same date, this Court lifted
Mr. Johnston’s stay of execution.
On February 8, 2010, Mr. Johnston filed his sixth successive
motion to vacate judgment and sentence claiming that newly
discovered evidence obtained through the WAIS-IV IQ test revealed
that Mr. Johnston was mentally retarded and thus the State of
Florida is barred from executing him under Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002). The circuit court held a case management
conference and heard argument of counsel on February 19, 2010.
The circuit court then took the matter under advisement. On that
same day, subsequent to the parties’ argument, Governor Crist
reset Mr. Johnston’s execution date for March 9, 2010, at 6:00
motion to vacate judgment and sentence claiming that newly
discovered evidence obtained through the WAIS-IV IQ test revealed
that Mr. Johnston was mentally retarded and thus the State of
Florida is barred from executing him under Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002). The circuit court held a case management
conference and heard argument of counsel on February 19, 2010.
The circuit court then took the matter under advisement. On that
same day, subsequent to the parties’ argument, Governor Crist
reset Mr. Johnston’s execution date for March 9, 2010, at 6:00
p.m.
The circuit court then held a second case management
conference on February 23, 2010. The court orally denied the
motion at the case management conference and provided a detailed
written order after 5:00 p.m. the same day. This appeal follows.
conference on February 23, 2010. The court orally denied the
motion at the case management conference and provided a detailed
written order after 5:00 p.m. the same day. This appeal follows.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Court previously summarized the facts and circumstances
of the murder of Mary Hammond as follows:
At approximately 3:30 a.m. on November 5, 1983,
David Eugene Johnston called the Orlando PoliceDepartment, identified himself as Martin White, andtold the police “somebody killed my grandma” at 406 E.
Ridgewood Avenue. Upon their arrival, the officersfound the dead body of 84-year old Mary Hammond. Thevictim’s body revealed numerous stab wounds as well asevidence of manual strangulation. The police arrested
David Eugene Johnston called the Orlando PoliceDepartment, identified himself as Martin White, andtold the police “somebody killed my grandma” at 406 E.
Ridgewood Avenue. Upon their arrival, the officersfound the dead body of 84-year old Mary Hammond. Thevictim’s body revealed numerous stab wounds as well asevidence of manual strangulation. The police arrested
Johnston after noticing that his clothes were bloodstained,
his face was scratched and his conversationswith the various officers at the scene of the crime
revealed several discrepancies as to his account of theevening’s events.
The record reveals that prior to the murderJohnston had been working at a demolition site near thevictim’s home and had had contact with the victim
during that time. In fact, Johnston was seen washingdishes in the victim’s apartment five nights before themurder.
during that time. In fact, Johnston was seen washingdishes in the victim’s apartment five nights before themurder.
Johnston was seen earlier on the evening of themurder without any scratches on his face and theclothing he was wearing tested positive for blood. Inaddition, the watch that Johnston was seen wearing aslate as 1:45 a.m. on the morning of the murder wasfound covered with blood on the bathroom countertop inthe victim’s home. Further, a butterfly pendant thatJohnston was seen wearing as late as 2:00 a.m. thatmorning was found entangled in the victim’s hair. Therecord also reveals that a reddish-brown stained
butcher-type knife was found between the mattress andthe boxspring of the victim’s bed, a footprint matchingJohnston’s was found outside the kitchen window of the
victim’s house, and the silver tableware, flatware, asilver candlestick, a wine bottle and a brass teapotbelonging to the victim were found in a pillowcaselocated in the front-end loader parked at thedemolition site.
butcher-type knife was found between the mattress andthe boxspring of the victim’s bed, a footprint matchingJohnston’s was found outside the kitchen window of the
victim’s house, and the silver tableware, flatware, asilver candlestick, a wine bottle and a brass teapotbelonging to the victim were found in a pillowcaselocated in the front-end loader parked at thedemolition site.
Johnston v. State, 497 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1986).
In his Sixth Successive Motion to Vacate Judgments of
Conviction and Sentence With Special Request for Leave to Amend,
Mr. Johnston delineated the facts relevant that motion as
follows:
5. Mr. Johnston previously filed a successivemotion to vacate his judgment and sentence thatincluded a claim that he was mentally retarded and thusthe State was barred from executing him. The FloridaSupreme Court observed:
In June 2002, Johnston filed a Motion to VacateJudgment of Conviction and Sentences in the trialcourt because he is mentally retarded and hisexecution would violate his constitutional rightsunder the Eighth Amendment. Without conducting anevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied reliefin a written order dated January 31, 2003.
Johnston appealed the trial court’s denial ofrelief to this Court, and the Court relinquishedjurisdiction in its Clarified Order RelinquishingJurisdiction for Determination of Mental
Retardation dated December 17, 2004. After anevidentiary hearing, the trial court found thatJohnston is not mentally retarded. Johnston v.
State, 960 So.2d 757 (Fla. 2006).
On remand, the trial court denied this claim on July26, 2005 and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed thedenial on May 4, 2006.
6. Both the denial of Mr. Johnston’s priormental retardation claim and its subsequent affirmancehinged on the fact that Dr. Pritchard3 administered the
WAIS-III IQ test and obtained a score of 84. Based on
this score both Dr. Pritchard and Dr. Blandino
concluded that Mr. Johnston was not mentally retarded,
and they did not conduct an adaptive functioningassessment.
7. The trial court stated in its “Order FindingDefendant is Not Mentally Retarded” that: “Based on theforegoing, the Court finds that the evidencedemonstrates that Defendant failed to meet the first
prong of the test for evaluating mental retardation.
Therefore, it is not necessary to reach the remainingprongs of the three-part test.” See Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.203.”
8. In affirming the circuit court’s order, theFlorida Supreme Court stated:
WAIS-III IQ test and obtained a score of 84. Based on
this score both Dr. Pritchard and Dr. Blandino
concluded that Mr. Johnston was not mentally retarded,
and they did not conduct an adaptive functioningassessment.
7. The trial court stated in its “Order FindingDefendant is Not Mentally Retarded” that: “Based on theforegoing, the Court finds that the evidencedemonstrates that Defendant failed to meet the first
prong of the test for evaluating mental retardation.
Therefore, it is not necessary to reach the remainingprongs of the three-part test.” See Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.203.”
8. In affirming the circuit court’s order, theFlorida Supreme Court stated:
While Johnston is correct that the experts in hiscase did not perform adaptive functioning testsunder the second prong of rule 3.203, bothexperts’ testified that this testing was
3Drs. Pritchard and Blandino were appointed by the court toconduct a mental retardation determination.
unnecessary and contrary to standard professionalpractice because all three prongs of the rule mustbe met in order for a defendant to be found
mentally retarded. Finally, both experts concludedthat Johnston is not mentally retarded pursuant torule 3.203. Therefore, there was competent,
substantial evidence to support the trial court’sfinding that Johnston is not mentally retarded.
Johnston v. State, 960 So.2d 757, 761-762 (Fla.
2006).
9. Subsequent to the Florida Supreme Court’sdetermination, the WAIS-IV IQ test was developed. This
test constitutes the most current and accurate test for
a determination of mental retardation. As Dr.
Eisenstein, one of the experts who recently examinedMr. Johnston for mental retardation, stated in hisreport:
The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale - 4th
Edition, was administered to Mr. David Johnston.
This is the most current, up to date edition ofthe Weschler Intelligence Scale, revised in 2008.
Research indicates that the WAIS-IV, with its newconfiguration of four index scores rather thanjust a Verbal and Performance score, is a moreappropriate and better test than previouseditions, with more reliable and valid scores. SeeAppendix A.
test constitutes the most current and accurate test for
a determination of mental retardation. As Dr.
Eisenstein, one of the experts who recently examinedMr. Johnston for mental retardation, stated in hisreport:
The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale - 4th
Edition, was administered to Mr. David Johnston.
This is the most current, up to date edition ofthe Weschler Intelligence Scale, revised in 2008.
Research indicates that the WAIS-IV, with its newconfiguration of four index scores rather thanjust a Verbal and Performance score, is a moreappropriate and better test than previouseditions, with more reliable and valid scores. SeeAppendix A.
10. Similarly, Dr. Krop, who also recentlyexamined Mr. Johnston for mental retardation, stated:
As you likely know, Mr. Johnston has beenassessed on numerous occasions with various tests
of intellectual functioning. His scores haveranged from an IQ as low as 57 to as high as 84.
It is noteworthy, however that the WAIS-IV isconsidered the most accurate assessment of
intellectual functioning with more reliable andvalid scores as it includes measures of verbal
comprehension, perceptual reasoning, workingmemory and processing speed. See Appendix B.
11. The results of Mr. Johnston’s recent IQtesting utilizing the WAIS-IV establishes that his IQis 61. See Appendix A, B. As Dr. Krop explained inhis report:
A review of Dr. Eisenstein’s test data shows Mr.
Johnston’s Full Scale IQ to be 61 which is in the
0.5 percentile of the overall population. Theresults of the TOMM indicate adequate effort onMr. Johnston’s part. See Appendix B.
12. An IQ score of 61 is significant in that Mr.
Johnston now satisfies the first prong of Fl.R.Cr.P.
Johnston now satisfies the first prong of Fl.R.Cr.P.
3.203 because he suffers from subaverage generalintellectual functioning due to his performance two ormore standard deviations from the mean on the WAIS-IV.
Heightening this significance is the fact that this isthe very prong upon which Mr. Johnston’s prior mentalretardation claim was denied.
Heightening this significance is the fact that this isthe very prong upon which Mr. Johnston’s prior mentalretardation claim was denied.
13. In addition to an IQ of 61, Mr. Johnston hasdeficits in his adaptive behavior. As Dr. Krop statedin his report:
In addition to the intellectual assessment, it isnecessary to assess an individual’s adaptivefunctioning level both currently and prior to theage of eighteen. A review of family interviews andthe results of the ABAS show deficits in adaptivefunctioning in several areas includingcommunication, community use, functionalacademics, home living, health and safety,
leisure, self-care, self-direction, andsocialization. Family members describe significantdeficits from an early age and records reviewedsupport this contention. The onset of hiscognitive and social deficits certainly occurredprior to the age of eighteen as he was admitted tothe Leesville State School for the MentallyRetarded in 1973 and family members report that hehas had considerable difficulty regarding hisadaptive behavior as long as they can remember.
See Appendix B.4
In addition to the intellectual assessment, it isnecessary to assess an individual’s adaptivefunctioning level both currently and prior to theage of eighteen. A review of family interviews andthe results of the ABAS show deficits in adaptivefunctioning in several areas includingcommunication, community use, functionalacademics, home living, health and safety,
leisure, self-care, self-direction, andsocialization. Family members describe significantdeficits from an early age and records reviewedsupport this contention. The onset of hiscognitive and social deficits certainly occurredprior to the age of eighteen as he was admitted tothe Leesville State School for the MentallyRetarded in 1973 and family members report that hehas had considerable difficulty regarding hisadaptive behavior as long as they can remember.
See Appendix B.4
14. Significant medical and legally recognizedindicia of mental retardation is abundant to support
4In his previous mental retardation determination, Mr.
Johnston’s adaptive behavior was not reviewed by the mental
health experts, Drs. Pritchard and Blandino, and the trial court
did not consider such in his “Order Finding Defendant is Not
Mentally Retarded.” Johnston, 960 So.2d at 761-762.
Drs. Krop’s and Eisenstein’s findings of mentalretardation. Mr. Johnston’s school records indicate
that he was considered mentally retarded in school andplaced in classes for the mentally retarded and inspecial education prior to age eighteen. In 1967 at
the age of 7, Mr. Johnston was administered theStanford-Binet Intelligence Scale test at the NortheastSpecial Education Center in Louisiana. PsychologistJohn R. Morella administered the Stanford-Binet
Intelligence Scale test and the Peabody PictureVocabulary Test. Mr. Johnston scored a full scale IQscore of 57 on the Stanford-Binet.
15. When he was twelve years old, Mr. Johnstonwas again evaluated for mental retardation. He
“performed within the retarded educable range” with an
“performed within the retarded educable range” with an
I.Q. of 65. (PCR. Vol.3, 63). At the age of twelve,
Mr. Johnston was performing at the first grade level inmath and could not understand simple subtraction andaddition problems. (Id.) He was reading at a thirdgrade level. (Id.) A 1973 report from the MonroeRegional Mental Health Center confirms the diagnosisthat Mr. Johnston was mentally retarded and hadexhibited almost uncontrollable behavior at home and at
school. (Id.) On August 14, 1973, Mr. Johnston wasplaced at Leesville State School for the Retarded.5 He
was thirteen years of age at the time he was admitted.6
Mr. Johnston was performing at the first grade level inmath and could not understand simple subtraction andaddition problems. (Id.) He was reading at a thirdgrade level. (Id.) A 1973 report from the MonroeRegional Mental Health Center confirms the diagnosisthat Mr. Johnston was mentally retarded and hadexhibited almost uncontrollable behavior at home and at
school. (Id.) On August 14, 1973, Mr. Johnston wasplaced at Leesville State School for the Retarded.5 He
was thirteen years of age at the time he was admitted.6
16. On November 18, 1975, Mr. Johnston attendedjuvenile court in Leesville, Louisiana. He was
referred to the Juvenile Reception and DiagnosticCenter and later to the Louisiana Training Institute(LTI). He was released from LTI on June 8, 1976. On
November 2, 1976, Mr. Johnston was arrested forstealing $7.50 from a neighbor’s house. Mr. Johnston
plead guilty, and the Judge ordered that a socialhistory report be completed prior to sentencing. The
referred to the Juvenile Reception and DiagnosticCenter and later to the Louisiana Training Institute(LTI). He was released from LTI on June 8, 1976. On
November 2, 1976, Mr. Johnston was arrested forstealing $7.50 from a neighbor’s house. Mr. Johnston
plead guilty, and the Judge ordered that a socialhistory report be completed prior to sentencing. The
5On March 30, 1964, Leesville State School was established.
The school was specifically for “the training and rehabilitationof educable and/or trainable mentally retarded children.” See
Statute of Louisiana, Act 321 (1960).
The school was specifically for “the training and rehabilitationof educable and/or trainable mentally retarded children.” See
Statute of Louisiana, Act 321 (1960).
6Mr. Johnston’s aunt, Charlene Benoit, testified at theevidentiary hearing in 1988. Mrs. Benoit described the
difficulties that Mr. Johnston had in school and how he was
eventually sent to a school for the retarded. (PC-R. 1286)
difficulties that Mr. Johnston had in school and how he was
eventually sent to a school for the retarded. (PC-R. 1286)
juvenile probation officer wrote in his report that Mr.
Johnston is “... a sixteen year old boy who is badlyretarded. He does not seem to know right from wrong.”
See Appendix C.7
17. The information obtained from reports fromMr. Johnston’s institutional history are corroboratedby family members. Ms. Careen Johnston testifiedpreviously in post-conviction and was interviewedconcerning Mr. Johnston’s childhood history andadaptive functioning skills. Mr. Clifford Johnston and
Ms. Debra Johnston, Mr. Johnston’s brother and sister,
were also interviewed. The story that emerges is one ofutter deprivation, severe child abuse, limited adaptivefunctioning, and mental retardation throughout Mr.
Johnston’s childhood.
18. At an evidentiary hearing family memberswould be able to testify that they always knewsomething was wrong with Mr. Johnston. He was unable
to relate to children his age and exhibited significantlearning difficulties. Mr. Johnston was unable to
understand or participate in the games his peers wouldplay and would become extremely frustrated and agitatedwhen he could not understand.
19. Mr. Johnston had the same difficulties in
school. School work and learning frustrated him to noend and his lack of achievement reflected his severe
limitations. When Mr. Johnston did not understand what
he was being taught he would get upset and often state,
“I can’t do it and I’m not doing it anymore.” Other
than attending Leesville State School for the MentallyRetarded, family members can only remember Mr. Johnstonattending public elementary school for one year.
20. Mr. Johnston exhibited a severely limitedability to care for himself throughout his life.
Significant anecdotal evidence of this fact isavailable. Without direct supervision, Mr. Johnstonwould place himself in dangerous situations. As a
result, he was not allowed to cook on the stove and waslimited to only making himself sandwiches. Even this
Ms. Debra Johnston, Mr. Johnston’s brother and sister,
were also interviewed. The story that emerges is one ofutter deprivation, severe child abuse, limited adaptivefunctioning, and mental retardation throughout Mr.
Johnston’s childhood.
18. At an evidentiary hearing family memberswould be able to testify that they always knewsomething was wrong with Mr. Johnston. He was unable
to relate to children his age and exhibited significantlearning difficulties. Mr. Johnston was unable to
understand or participate in the games his peers wouldplay and would become extremely frustrated and agitatedwhen he could not understand.
19. Mr. Johnston had the same difficulties in
school. School work and learning frustrated him to noend and his lack of achievement reflected his severe
limitations. When Mr. Johnston did not understand what
he was being taught he would get upset and often state,
“I can’t do it and I’m not doing it anymore.” Other
than attending Leesville State School for the MentallyRetarded, family members can only remember Mr. Johnstonattending public elementary school for one year.
20. Mr. Johnston exhibited a severely limitedability to care for himself throughout his life.
Significant anecdotal evidence of this fact isavailable. Without direct supervision, Mr. Johnstonwould place himself in dangerous situations. As a
result, he was not allowed to cook on the stove and waslimited to only making himself sandwiches. Even this
7 In March of 1978, Mr. Johnston starting receiving moneyfrom the Social Security Administration because of his mentaldisabilities.
menial task was beyond Mr. Johnston’s capability. He
would put entirely inappropriate combinations of foodon the sandwiches. Mr. Johnston’s food combinations
would make most people ill. He would put anything hecould find in the refrigerator together, such as mixingfruit, vegetables, meat, and syrup on the samesandwich.
21. Mr. Johnston was also unable to control the
amount of food he consumed and unless monitored closelywould eat to the point of becoming physically ill. He
would hide food all over the house and his parentswould only find it once it began to smell.
22. Growing up, Mr. Johnston was unable to usethe washer and dryer, or complete any complicatedtasks. He could not balance a check book8, add,
subtract, make change, or generally have any concept ofmoney. To this day Mr. Johnston cannot do math, exceptfor adding single digit numbers, and his literacy isextremely limited.
23. In his teen years, Mr. Johnston was unable tofill out job applications, hold a full-time job, oroperate anything beyond the most elemental machinery.
Mr. Johnston was unable to obtain a drivers license and
continually wrecked when being taught how to drive.
Both Drs. Eisenstein and Krop have reviewed records andconsidered the information corroborated by familymembers and have concluded that in addition to his subaverage
intellectual functioning, Mr. Johnston suffersfrom concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptivefunctioning. See App. A, B.
24. Both Dr. Eisenstein and Dr. Krop haveconcluded that Mr. Johnston meets the criteria for
mental retardation finding that he demonstratessignificantly sub-average intellectual functioning,
with concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptivefunctioning in at least two areas and the onset wasprior to the age of eighteen. See App. A, B. Given
that Mr. Johnston is mentally retarded, his sentence ofdeath stands in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
amount of food he consumed and unless monitored closelywould eat to the point of becoming physically ill. He
would hide food all over the house and his parentswould only find it once it began to smell.
22. Growing up, Mr. Johnston was unable to usethe washer and dryer, or complete any complicatedtasks. He could not balance a check book8, add,
subtract, make change, or generally have any concept ofmoney. To this day Mr. Johnston cannot do math, exceptfor adding single digit numbers, and his literacy isextremely limited.
23. In his teen years, Mr. Johnston was unable tofill out job applications, hold a full-time job, oroperate anything beyond the most elemental machinery.
Mr. Johnston was unable to obtain a drivers license and
continually wrecked when being taught how to drive.
Both Drs. Eisenstein and Krop have reviewed records andconsidered the information corroborated by familymembers and have concluded that in addition to his subaverage
intellectual functioning, Mr. Johnston suffersfrom concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptivefunctioning. See App. A, B.
24. Both Dr. Eisenstein and Dr. Krop haveconcluded that Mr. Johnston meets the criteria for
mental retardation finding that he demonstratessignificantly sub-average intellectual functioning,
with concurrent deficits or impairments in adaptivefunctioning in at least two areas and the onset wasprior to the age of eighteen. See App. A, B. Given
that Mr. Johnston is mentally retarded, his sentence ofdeath stands in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
8Inmates report that they have to monitor Mr. Johnston’s
canteen account and apprise him of the balance and what he can
afford to buy.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Newly discovered evidence of mental retardation demonstrates
that Mr. Johnston’s death sentence violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Florida’s constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. In Mr. Johnston’s case, the circuit court
erroneously failed to grant an evidentiary hearing despite
allegations regarding the substance of the new evidence, the
constitutional claim based upon the new evidence, and Mr.
Johnston’s diligence in bringing forth the claim. The circuit
court failed to take the facts as true and instead impermissibly
relied on “independent research”. The circuit court also largely
ignored Mr. Johnston’s allegations in the order summarily denying
relief, and it applied erroneous legal standards. This Court
should order an evidentiary hearing.
that Mr. Johnston’s death sentence violates the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
Florida’s constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. In Mr. Johnston’s case, the circuit court
erroneously failed to grant an evidentiary hearing despite
allegations regarding the substance of the new evidence, the
constitutional claim based upon the new evidence, and Mr.
Johnston’s diligence in bringing forth the claim. The circuit
court failed to take the facts as true and instead impermissibly
relied on “independent research”. The circuit court also largely
ignored Mr. Johnston’s allegations in the order summarily denying
relief, and it applied erroneous legal standards. This Court
should order an evidentiary hearing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The claims presented in this appeal are constitutional
issues involving mixed questions of law and fact and are reviewed
de novo, giving deference only to the circuit court’s fact
findings. Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999);
State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 n.7 (Fla. 2001). The
circuit court denied an evidentiary hearing, and therefore the
facts presented in this appeal must be taken as true. Peede v.
issues involving mixed questions of law and fact and are reviewed
de novo, giving deference only to the circuit court’s fact
findings. Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1034 (Fla. 1999);
State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 n.7 (Fla. 2001). The
circuit court denied an evidentiary hearing, and therefore the
facts presented in this appeal must be taken as true. Peede v.
State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999); Gaskin v. State, 737 So.
2d 509, 516 (Fla. 1999); Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 So. 2d 1364
(Fla. 1989).
ARGUMENT
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION
DEMONSTRATES MR. JOHNSTON’S DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES THE
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND FLORIDA’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
DEMONSTRATES MR. JOHNSTON’S DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATES THE
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND FLORIDA’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
Within Mr. Johnston’s successive motion to vacate, he
advanced his claim that newly discovered evidence established
that he is mentally retarded; and that, therefore, the State of
Florida is barred from executing him under Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002). The newly discovered evidence was the
result of an IQ test result of 61 obtained by utilizing the newly
promulgated WAIS-IV. The WAIS-IV is the most current and
accurate test available.9
advanced his claim that newly discovered evidence established
that he is mentally retarded; and that, therefore, the State of
Florida is barred from executing him under Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002). The newly discovered evidence was the
result of an IQ test result of 61 obtained by utilizing the newly
promulgated WAIS-IV. The WAIS-IV is the most current and
accurate test available.9
The circuit court summarily denied Mr. Johnston’s claim,
ruling alternatively that the motion was untimely, abusive, and
did not constitute newly discovered evidence. Mr. Johnston will
first discuss the fact that the circuit court engaged in an
improper analysis and then address each basis for the erroneous
denial:
ruling alternatively that the motion was untimely, abusive, and
did not constitute newly discovered evidence. Mr. Johnston will
first discuss the fact that the circuit court engaged in an
improper analysis and then address each basis for the erroneous
denial:
9Mr. Johnston’s prior score from a previous mentalretardation hearing was an 84, although scores as low as a 57 hadbeen obtained during Mr. Johnston’s childhood.
A. The Circuit Court Improperly Conducted IndependentResearch in Denying Mr. Johnston’s Sixth SuccessiveMotion to Vacate.
The circuit court stated the considerations that went into
its “Order Denying Sixth Successive Postconviction Relief Motion
and Request for Leave to Amend” as follows:
After fully reviewing Defendant’s allegations alongwith the transcripts from the June 24, 2005 evidentiaryhearing dealing with the issue of mental retardation,
the files, motions filed by both parties, the argumentsof counsel at the hearing on this motion on February19, 2010 and after conducting independent research and
reviewing prior court opinions, this Court finds thatDefendant’s motion must be denied.
the files, motions filed by both parties, the argumentsof counsel at the hearing on this motion on February19, 2010 and after conducting independent research and
reviewing prior court opinions, this Court finds thatDefendant’s motion must be denied.
(PCR3 at 246)(emphasis added).
The circuit court’s reliance upon independent research
clearly violates the dictates of Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.851(h)(6), which
states that the court can only deny an evidentiary hearing on a
defendant’s motion to vacate filed after warrant, “If the motion,
files, and records in the case conclusively show that the movant
is entitled to no relief.” This standard is the same as for all
successive motions. See 3.851(f)(5)(B).10 Furthermore, the
10Indeed, successive Rule 3.850 petitioners have receivedevidentiary hearings based on newly discovered evidence andmerits consideration. State v. Mills, 788 So. 2d 249, 250 (Fla.
2001)(the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’sgrant of sentencing relief on a third Rule 3.850 motion premisedupon a testifying co-defendant’s inconsistent statements to anindividual while incarcerated); Lightbourne v. State, 742 So. 2d238, 249 (Fla. 1999)(remanding for an evidentiary hearing toevaluate the reliability and veracity of trial testimony);
Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1998)(noting that lowercourt held an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s allegations thatanother individual had confessed to committing the crimes with
2001)(the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’sgrant of sentencing relief on a third Rule 3.850 motion premisedupon a testifying co-defendant’s inconsistent statements to anindividual while incarcerated); Lightbourne v. State, 742 So. 2d238, 249 (Fla. 1999)(remanding for an evidentiary hearing toevaluate the reliability and veracity of trial testimony);
Melendez v. State, 718 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1998)(noting that lowercourt held an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s allegations thatanother individual had confessed to committing the crimes with
information in the motion should be taken “at face value” and
accepted as true, which is “sufficient to require an evidentiary
hearing.” Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549 So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1989);
Smith v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 1990). To deny Mr.
Johnston an evidentiary hearing would violate his federal rights
to due process and the Florida Constitution. See, Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976).
By performing independent research the circuit court
violated the dictates of Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.851. Interestingly, one
can see the product of the circuit court’s independent research
in the portion of the order discussing the WAIS-IV as it relates
to the WAIS-III. The circuit court stated:
The WAIS-IV IQ test is not newly discoveredevidence because it is merely a refinement of the WAIS-
which defendant was charged and convicted); Swafford v. State,
679 So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1996)(remanding for an evidentiaryhearing to determine if evidence would probably produce anacquittal); Roberts v. State, 678 So. 2d 1232, 1235 (Fla.
1996)(remanding for an evidentiary hearing because of trialwitness recanting her testimony); Scott v. State, 657 So. 2d1129, 1132 (Fla. 1995)(holding that lower court erred in failingto hold an evidentiary hearing and remanding); Johnson v.
Singletary, 647 So. 2d 106, 111 (Fla. 1994)(remanding case forlimited evidentiary hearing to permit affiants to testify andallow appellant to “demonstrate the corroborating circumstancessufficient to establish the trustworthiness of [newly discoveredevidence]”); Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla.
1991)(remanding for an evidentiary hearing on allegations thatanother individual confessed to the murder with which Jones was
charged and convicted and was seen in the area close in time tothe murder with a shotgun).
679 So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1996)(remanding for an evidentiaryhearing to determine if evidence would probably produce anacquittal); Roberts v. State, 678 So. 2d 1232, 1235 (Fla.
1996)(remanding for an evidentiary hearing because of trialwitness recanting her testimony); Scott v. State, 657 So. 2d1129, 1132 (Fla. 1995)(holding that lower court erred in failingto hold an evidentiary hearing and remanding); Johnson v.
Singletary, 647 So. 2d 106, 111 (Fla. 1994)(remanding case forlimited evidentiary hearing to permit affiants to testify andallow appellant to “demonstrate the corroborating circumstancessufficient to establish the trustworthiness of [newly discoveredevidence]”); Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911, 916 (Fla.
1991)(remanding for an evidentiary hearing on allegations thatanother individual confessed to the murder with which Jones was
charged and convicted and was seen in the area close in time tothe murder with a shotgun).
III test. Furthermore, the results of the WAIS-IV testare based on data that was previously available and hasalready been taken into consideration for the purposeof assessing Defendant’s IQ. The additional subtestsadded to the WAIS-IV measure the same factors alreadytested in the WAIS-III - - verbal comprehension,
perceptual reasoning [FN1], working memory, andprocessing speed. The defense argument is that theWAIS-IV is a reconfiguration of the WAIS-III and thatthe WAIS-IV changed the weight of the factors used todetermine the score. Since these factors were
previously available and considered using the WAIS-IIItest, the WAIS-IV test is not newly discovered evidencebut in essence is a republication of the WAIS-III testin a new form. [FN1] Perceptual organization in WAIS
III.
(PCR3 at 253-254).
This analysis is not based upon any information found within
the motions, files, and records within Mr. Johnston’s case.
Within his motion Mr. Johnston stated as follows regarding the
WAIS-IV:
9. Subsequent to the Florida Supreme Court’sdetermination, the WAIS-IV IQ test was developed. This
test constitutes the most current and accurate test for
a determination of mental retardation. As Dr.
Eisenstein, one of the experts who recently examinedMr. Johnston for mental retardation, stated in hisreport:
The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale - 4th
Edition, was administered to Mr. David Johnston.
This is the most current, up to date edition ofthe Weschler Intelligence Scale, revised in 2008.
Research indicates that the WAIS-IV, with its newconfiguration of four index scores rather thanjust a Verbal and Performance score, is a moreappropriate and better test than previouseditions, with more reliable and valid scores. SeeAppendix A.
test constitutes the most current and accurate test for
a determination of mental retardation. As Dr.
Eisenstein, one of the experts who recently examinedMr. Johnston for mental retardation, stated in hisreport:
The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale - 4th
Edition, was administered to Mr. David Johnston.
This is the most current, up to date edition ofthe Weschler Intelligence Scale, revised in 2008.
Research indicates that the WAIS-IV, with its newconfiguration of four index scores rather thanjust a Verbal and Performance score, is a moreappropriate and better test than previouseditions, with more reliable and valid scores. SeeAppendix A.
10. Similarly, Dr. Krop, who also recentlyexamined Mr. Johnston for mental retardation, stated:
As you likely know, Mr. Johnston has been assessedon numerous occasions with various tests of
intellectual functioning. His scores have rangedfrom an IQ as low as 57 to as high as 84. It isnoteworthy, however that the WAIS-IV is consideredthe most accurate assessment of intellectual
functioning with more reliable and valid scores asit includes measures of verbal comprehension,
perceptual reasoning, working memory andprocessing speed. See Appendix B.
11. The results of Mr. Johnston’s recent IQtesting utilizing the WAIS-IV establishes that his IQis 61. See Appendix A, B. As Dr. Krop explained inhis report:
A review of Dr. Eisenstein’s test data shows Mr.
Johnston’s Full Scale IQ to be 61 which is in the
0.5 percentile of the overall population. Theresults of the TOMM indicate adequate effort onMr. Johnston’s part. See Appendix B.
12. An IQ score of 61 is significant in that Mr.
Johnston now satisfies the first prong of Fl.R.Cr.P.
Johnston now satisfies the first prong of Fl.R.Cr.P.
3.203 because he suffers from subaverage generalintellectual functioning due to his performance two ormore standard deviations from the mean on the WAIS-IV.
Heightening this significance is the fact that this isthe very prong upon which Mr. Johnston’s prior mentalretardation claim was denied. PCR3 14-15.
Heightening this significance is the fact that this isthe very prong upon which Mr. Johnston’s prior mentalretardation claim was denied. PCR3 14-15.
In its response to Mr. Johnston’s motion, the State made no
mention of the difference between the two tests.
Here, contrary to this Court’s precedent and Fla.R.Cr.P.
3.851, the circuit court failed to either accept as true Mr.
Johnston’s factual allegations or find that Mr. Johnston’s
factual allegations were conclusively refuted by the files and
records in this case.11 Instead, the circuit court substituted
its opinion for that of the clearly expressed opinions of the two
experts relied upon by Mr. Johnston, presumably by relying on
independent evidence.
Mr. Johnston submits that when the facts asserted in his
successive postconviction motion are accepted as true, it is
clear that the files and records in the case do not conclusively
refute his claims, thus requiring an evidentiary hearing.
successive postconviction motion are accepted as true, it is
clear that the files and records in the case do not conclusively
refute his claims, thus requiring an evidentiary hearing.
B. Contrary to the Circuit Court’s Order Mr. Johnston’sSuccessive Motion Is Not Untimely.
The circuit court ruled that Mr. Johnston’s motion was
untimely by stating:
The instant motion is untimely. Under Florida Ruleof Criminal Procedure 3.203, a mental retardation claimmust be filed with an initial 3.851 motion within the
time provided in Rule 3.203 or in some cases, in asuccessive 3.851 motion. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.203.
Defendant’s previous motion for postconviction reliefasserting that he is mentally retarded was denied bythe court and affirmed on appeal. Johnston v. State,
960 So.2d 757 (Fla. 2006). Therefore the time forraising this claim has long passed.
time provided in Rule 3.203 or in some cases, in asuccessive 3.851 motion. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.203.
Defendant’s previous motion for postconviction reliefasserting that he is mentally retarded was denied bythe court and affirmed on appeal. Johnston v. State,
960 So.2d 757 (Fla. 2006). Therefore the time forraising this claim has long passed.
(PCR3 at 251).
Mr. Johnston submits that the circuit court erred in its
ruling. The fact is that Mr. Johnston did bring a timely mental
retardation claim in 2002. Contrary to the circuit court’s
erroneous conclusion, the claim brought in these proceedings is
11The files and records contained no information whatsoever
relative to the WAIS-IV, its reliability, or its configuration.
relative to the WAIS-IV, its reliability, or its configuration.
based upon newly discovered evidence of mental retardation. Mr.
Johnston pled diligence in his successor postconviction motion:
27. Undersigned counsel learned of theavailability of the WAIS-IV IQ test in May 2009 indiscussions with Dr. Krop, and later Dr. Eisenstein.
Due to his schedule Dr. Krop was unable to return andfurther evaluate Mr. Johnston until much later. Dr.
Eisenstein had to purchase the test and would latertravel to further evaluate Mr. Johnston on July 20,2009. After Mr. Johnston scored a 61, subsequentinvestigation was conducted by Mr. Johnston’sinvestigator at the request of the undersigned.
Subsequent to that investigation, the undersignedprovided documentation and made family membersavailable for interview to Drs. Eisenstein and Krop.
The doctors rendered their respective reports onDecember 10, 2009 and January 8, 2010. Therefore, theundersigned brought this claim within one year oflearning of the newly discovered evidence.
Due to his schedule Dr. Krop was unable to return andfurther evaluate Mr. Johnston until much later. Dr.
Eisenstein had to purchase the test and would latertravel to further evaluate Mr. Johnston on July 20,2009. After Mr. Johnston scored a 61, subsequentinvestigation was conducted by Mr. Johnston’sinvestigator at the request of the undersigned.
Subsequent to that investigation, the undersignedprovided documentation and made family membersavailable for interview to Drs. Eisenstein and Krop.
The doctors rendered their respective reports onDecember 10, 2009 and January 8, 2010. Therefore, theundersigned brought this claim within one year oflearning of the newly discovered evidence.
Factual allegations as to the merits of a constitutional claim as
well as to issues of diligence must be accepted as true, and an
evidentiary hearing is warranted if the claims involve “disputed
issues of fact.” Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla.
1996)(emphasis added). In its order denying relief, the circuit
court made no mention of these factual allegations, nor did it
find that they were conclusively refuted by the files and records
in this case. The circuit court’s determination that Mr.
Johnston’s motion was untimely is erroneous.12
12Moreover, contrary to the circuit court’s determination,
this Court has in fact allowed Atkins claims to be filed after
the expiration of the sixty day window set forth in Rule 3.203.
In the case of Coleman v. State, FSC Case No. SC04-1520, which iscurrently pending in this Court, the Court relinquishedjurisdiction on September 23, 2005, to permit consideration of anAtkins claim well after the expiration of the sixty day window
this Court has in fact allowed Atkins claims to be filed after
the expiration of the sixty day window set forth in Rule 3.203.
In the case of Coleman v. State, FSC Case No. SC04-1520, which iscurrently pending in this Court, the Court relinquishedjurisdiction on September 23, 2005, to permit consideration of anAtkins claim well after the expiration of the sixty day window
C. Contrary to the Circuit Court’s Order Mr. Johnston’sSixth Successive Motion Is Not An Abusive Successive
Motion.
The circuit court stated as follows in finding that Mr.
Johnston’s motion was abusive:
The instant motion is Defendant’s sixth successive
motion. The issue of mental retardation has been fullylitigated in this case. Defendant was evaluated in Mayand July of 2009, however, he did not notify the courtthat there was a pending evaluation or new issuesduring the hearing on the motion for DNA testing in2009 or in any of the motions filed in May or August2009. Defendant has not provided any good cause forfailing to raise this claim in his previous fourth andfifth successive motions. Accordingly, this motioncould have been raised in Defendant’s 2009
postconviction motions and is therefore denied as anabusive successive motion.
(PCR3 at 251).
Johnston’s motion was abusive:
The instant motion is Defendant’s sixth successive
motion. The issue of mental retardation has been fullylitigated in this case. Defendant was evaluated in Mayand July of 2009, however, he did not notify the courtthat there was a pending evaluation or new issuesduring the hearing on the motion for DNA testing in2009 or in any of the motions filed in May or August2009. Defendant has not provided any good cause forfailing to raise this claim in his previous fourth andfifth successive motions. Accordingly, this motioncould have been raised in Defendant’s 2009
postconviction motions and is therefore denied as anabusive successive motion.
(PCR3 at 251).
The circuit court’s ruling is erroneous. First, as noted in
subsection B above, undersigned counsel pled in his successive
postconviction motion that he met his obligation as to diligence
by bringing this claim within one year of learning of the newly
discovered evidence. This factual allegation has not been
conclusively refuted by the files and records in this case, and
therefore it must be accepted as true.
subsection B above, undersigned counsel pled in his successive
postconviction motion that he met his obligation as to diligence
by bringing this claim within one year of learning of the newly
discovered evidence. This factual allegation has not been
conclusively refuted by the files and records in this case, and
therefore it must be accepted as true.
Moreover, contrary to the circuit court’s determination, Mr.
Johnston in fact made reference to the pendency of WAIS-IV
testing in his initial brief filed before this Court in May 2009
where he stated:
Johnston in fact made reference to the pendency of WAIS-IV
testing in his initial brief filed before this Court in May 2009
where he stated:
set forth in Rule 3.203.
-20
-20
Dr. Eisenstein found that Mr. Johnston is very“primitive” in his ability to care for himself and hasextreme difficulty in adaptive functioning, both nowand in the past. Dr. Eisenstein opined that Johnston’sadaptive functioning places him in the same class ofpersons as those diagnosed as mentally retarded. Dr.
Eisenstein did not have enough time to give the newestIQ test, the WAIS-4. Dr. Eisenstein believes that
prior IQ scores artificially inflated Mr. Johnston’sscores. The new test, the WAIS-4, has accounted for thefactors that may have artificially inflated thesescores. This is due to a reconfiguring of the methodin which attention concentration is scored. At an
evidentiary hearing this evidence can be produced.
See, Initial Brief, Johnston v. State, SC09-839, pp.43-44.
Additionally, as Mr. Johnston’s counsel explained at the
case management conference on February 19, 2010, when he first
began to learn of the newly discovered evidence issue, the case
was either under the jurisdiction of this Court or on a limited
remand of the DNA issue:
THE COURT: Okay. One of the questions thatMr. Nunnelley raised in his response was that yourclient was tested prior to your filing that last, Ibelieve, fifth successive motion, and he alleges anabuse of discretion since you may have known at thattime the existence of this data and did not seek to
bring it up in that fifth successive motion. How would
you respond to that?
bring it up in that fifth successive motion. How would
you respond to that?
MR. DOSS: That was a very limited remand, Judge,
to deal with the DNA that was -- that was -
THE COURT: I'm talking about your motion.
MR. DOSS: That's what I'm saying. I filed that
pursuant to the very limited remand on the DNA. This
was actually an issue before Judge Wattles as towhether that exceeded the scope of remand or not. As
well, Judge, just because I know you're not familiarhow I came to be on this case, I actually came intothis case after the warrant was signed, brought the
pursuant to the very limited remand on the DNA. This
was actually an issue before Judge Wattles as towhether that exceeded the scope of remand or not. As
well, Judge, just because I know you're not familiarhow I came to be on this case, I actually came intothis case after the warrant was signed, brought the
motion. And then we received the remand. So when I
got this -- when I got this score, I knew of the 2005only from the –- you know, only from reading throughthe records and seeing that it was denied. So at that
point, based upon the fact that the second and thirdprong were never reached, I needed to go and do theproper investigation to find out did we meet the secondand third prong or not and had -- had an investigatortravel to Louisiana and do the investigation andprovided that, brought that raw information -- broughtthe raw information to the doctors. The doctors
conducted their own interviews, and based upon that,
they eventually produced the report, the ones that areappended to the motion. And then, Judge, I filed it,
and actually it was available to be heard immediatelycoming off of the mandate from the Florida SupremeCourt when this Court regained jurisdiction.
(PCR3 225-227).
Notably, the State moved to dismiss Mr. Johnston’s fifth
successive motion as exceeding the scope of the limited remand by
this Court on the DNA issue (PCR2 752-755).13 The circuit court
judge at the time, Judge Wattles, subsequently ruled that the
motion could be heard after an agreement by the State, where the
court stated: “That’s fine with me, whereas the collateral -
perhaps the way we would phrase the order would be as a
collateral issue that arose out of the testing report so I don't
give the impression to the Supreme Court about usurping
jurisdiction that I didn’t intend.” (PCR2 T. at 812).
13This Court’s order of relinquishment stated in pertinent
part as follows: “[W]e hereby relinquish jurisdiction for a
period of ninety days for the purpose of conducting DNA tests on
the above-referenced items of evidence pursuant to the provisions
of rule 3.853 and section 925.11, Florida Statutes (2008).” (PCR2
at 364).
Clearly, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr.
Johnston’s newly discovered evidence claim until after this Court
disposed of his pending issues following the remand. Once Mr.
Johnston’s claim was more fully investigated and the reports
ultimately issued on December 10, 2009 and January 8, 2010, the
instant motion was prepared and filed before the mandate issued
and the circuit court regained jurisdiction. This motion was not
an abuse of process, and it was filed well within the one year
time limit imposed upon filing claims based upon newly discovered
evidence. Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 251 (Fla. 2001).
D. Contrary to the Circuit Court’s Order Mr. Johnston’sSuccessive Motion Is Based Upon Newly DiscoveredEvidence.
The circuit court observed in its order denying Mr.
Johnston’s motion that, “The first question this Court must
answer is whether this evidence, the result of the WAIS-IV test,
is truly newly discovered evidence.” (PCR3 at 251-252). The
court proceeded to answer the question in the negative by finding
that, “The WAIS-IV IQ test is not newly discovered evidence
because it is merely a refinement of the WAIS-III test.” Order at
8-9. The court subsequently concluded:
Johnston’s motion that, “The first question this Court must
answer is whether this evidence, the result of the WAIS-IV test,
is truly newly discovered evidence.” (PCR3 at 251-252). The
court proceeded to answer the question in the negative by finding
that, “The WAIS-IV IQ test is not newly discovered evidence
because it is merely a refinement of the WAIS-III test.” Order at
8-9. The court subsequently concluded:
The Court finds that the WAIS-IV test is not a
substantial revision of intelligence testing thatchanges the science or methodology in a manner thatwould invalidate the previous WAIS-III test results.
Accordingly, Defendant’s claim of newly discoveredevidence does not warrant an evidentiary hearing and issummarily denied.
substantial revision of intelligence testing thatchanges the science or methodology in a manner thatwould invalidate the previous WAIS-III test results.
Accordingly, Defendant’s claim of newly discoveredevidence does not warrant an evidentiary hearing and issummarily denied.
(PCR3 at 256).
Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991) contains the
requisite standard for filing successive motions to vacate
pursuant to Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.851 that are based upon newly
discovered evidence. In Jones, this Court adopted the standard
for evaluating claims of newly discovered evidence from the
federal system. Jones holds that a court must first determine
that the “asserted facts ‘must have been unknown by the trial
court, by the party, by counsel at the time of trial, and it must
appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known them by
the use of diligence.’” Id. at 916 (quoting Hallman v. State,
371 So.2d 482, 485)(Fla. 1979). Next, a court must further
determine that, “The newly discovered evidence must be of such a
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”
Id. at 915. “If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence,
the second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence
would probably yield a less severe sentence.” Marek v. State, 14
So.3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009) citing Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911,
915 (Fla. 1991).
requisite standard for filing successive motions to vacate
pursuant to Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.851 that are based upon newly
discovered evidence. In Jones, this Court adopted the standard
for evaluating claims of newly discovered evidence from the
federal system. Jones holds that a court must first determine
that the “asserted facts ‘must have been unknown by the trial
court, by the party, by counsel at the time of trial, and it must
appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known them by
the use of diligence.’” Id. at 916 (quoting Hallman v. State,
371 So.2d 482, 485)(Fla. 1979). Next, a court must further
determine that, “The newly discovered evidence must be of such a
nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial.”
Id. at 915. “If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence,
the second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence
would probably yield a less severe sentence.” Marek v. State, 14
So.3d 985, 990 (Fla. 2009) citing Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911,
915 (Fla. 1991).
Mr. Johnston met the standard set forth in Jones. The
prohibition against the execution of the mentally retarded was
not effectuated until Atkins was rendered in 2002. Thus, this
claim was unavailable at the time of Mr. Johnston’s trial in
1984. Thereafter, the WAIS-IV was not available until after Mr.
prohibition against the execution of the mentally retarded was
not effectuated until Atkins was rendered in 2002. Thus, this
claim was unavailable at the time of Mr. Johnston’s trial in
1984. Thereafter, the WAIS-IV was not available until after Mr.
Johnston’s original mental retardation determination.
The score which Mr. Johnson obtained on the WAIS-IV, 61, in
conjunction with the finding of mental retardation by Drs. Krop
and Eisenstein, would yield a less severe sentence as Mr.
Johnston would not be eligible for the death penalty. Thus, the
evidence detailed within Mr. Johnston’s Rule 3.851 motion
constitutes newly discovered evidence requiring relief.
conjunction with the finding of mental retardation by Drs. Krop
and Eisenstein, would yield a less severe sentence as Mr.
Johnston would not be eligible for the death penalty. Thus, the
evidence detailed within Mr. Johnston’s Rule 3.851 motion
constitutes newly discovered evidence requiring relief.
At the very least, under the standard enunciated in Jones
and other cases decided by this Court, Mr. Johnston is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing. Jones; Moreland v. State, 582 So. 2d
618 (Fla. 1991); Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037 (Fla.
1989). The information in Mr. Johnston’s motion should have been
taken “at face value” and accepted as true, which is “sufficient
to require an evidentiary hearing.” Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549
So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1989); Smith v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 1293 (Fla.
1990).
and other cases decided by this Court, Mr. Johnston is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing. Jones; Moreland v. State, 582 So. 2d
618 (Fla. 1991); Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037 (Fla.
1989). The information in Mr. Johnston’s motion should have been
taken “at face value” and accepted as true, which is “sufficient
to require an evidentiary hearing.” Lightbourne v. Dugger, 549
So. 2d 1364 (Fla. 1989); Smith v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 1293 (Fla.
1990).
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing arguments, Mr. Johnston requests
that this matter be remanded to the circuit court for a full and
fair evidentiary hearing and for other relief as set forth in
this brief.
that this matter be remanded to the circuit court for a full and
fair evidentiary hearing and for other relief as set forth in
this brief.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been
furnished by electronic transmission and U.S. mail, postage
furnished by electronic transmission and U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, to Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Office of the Attorney General,
444 Seabreeze Blvd., 5th Floor, Daytona Beach, FL 32118 on March
1, 2010.
CERTIFICATE OF FONT
This is to certify that this Initial Brief has been produced
in a 12 point Courier type, a font that is not proportionately
spaced.
D. TODD DOSS
Florida Bar No. 0910384
725 Southeast Baya DriveSuite 102
Lake City, FL 32025-6092Telephone (386) 755-9119Facsimile (386) 755-3181
Florida Bar No. 0910384
725 Southeast Baya DriveSuite 102
Lake City, FL 32025-6092Telephone (386) 755-9119Facsimile (386) 755-3181
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